Abstract-Telecommunication systems are large and complex, consisting of multiple intelligent modules in shelves, multiple shelves in frames, and multiple frames to compose a single network element. In the availability and performability analysis of such a complex system, combinatorial models are computationally efficient but have limited expressive power. State-based models are expressive but computationally complex. Furthermore, this complexity grows exponentially with the size of the model. This state-space explosion problem must be solved in order to model complex-systems using state-based models.
1 The singular and plural of an acronym are always spelled the same.
NOTATION
set of down states set of up states set of red transitions set of green transitions failure rate repair rate equivalent failure rate equivalent repair rate infinitesimal generator matrix of CTMC element of reward rate of state steady-state probability of state .
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS paper describes a technique for solving the state-space explosion problem [6] , [12] , in state-based modeling. The technique was developed while modeling telecommunication equipment, but applies to any large system.
Bellcore's RQMS [2] defines sophisticated reliability measures that are important to the telecommunication industry, such as total outage, weighted outage, total DPM, weighted DPM, total OFM, and weighted OFM.
Complex behavior must be modeled to ensure that the results of the analysis reasonably approximate the system being modeled. Some of these behaviors are:
• hardware and software faults, • imperfect fault coverage (probability that fault management software successfully detects and recovers from the fault is less than 1), • fault recovery via switchover to a redundant module or rebooting of the faulty module, • a multi-tiered repair strategy whereby faults that result in a loss of redundancy, a partial outage, or a total outage, can be repaired at different rates. Combinatorial models such as fault tree and reliability block diagram [7] , [13] - [15] are simple, and there exist efficient algorithms for their solution. However, they have limited expressive power and cannot model complex behaviors or extract sophisticated measures such as Weighted Outages, or Weighted or Total OFM [11] .
State-based models, such as MRM and SRN [3] , [13] are more expressive, capable of modeling all the required behavior and supporting the extraction of all the required measures. However, state-based models suffer from the state-space explosion problem. To extract the sophisticated measures described in the RQMS from models describing the complex behavior of 0018-9529/03$17.00 © 2003 IEEE software-based systems, for large complex telecommunications equipment requires solving the state-space explosion problem [18] .
Hierarchical models [10] represent a large class of models that use hierarchical structures to avoid the large state-space problem in modeling complex systems. The solution described in this paper exploits the hierarchical nature of these systems, and the independence [1] , [4] , [5] of their subsystems. This technique breaks large models into a hierarchy of submodels where the submodels have -independent failure modes [13] or their -dependency can be expressed in the upper level of the hierarchy. The submodels are analyzed, important measures are extracted and used as input to a simplified version of the submodel in the next layer of the hierarchy. Focus of this specific hierarchical technique is on the steps of submodel simplification and hierarchical composition of submodel results together by using the equivalent failure and repair rates.
Section II provides the hierarchical composition with equivalent rates approach. Sections III and IV present the calculations of the equivalent models for availability and performability analysis, respectively. Section V applies this technique to the modeling of telecommunication network element, including when and how to apply the technique, how to calculate the commonly used industrial measures, and examples. Other applications of the equivalent rates are also discussed.
II. HIERARCHICAL COMPOSITION WITH EQUIVALENT RATES

A. Terminology
Some of the common reliability/availability and quality measures, especially for telecommunications systems, are:
• Total DPM: the number of minutes of downtime per year due to total outages. During these minutes, no service is provided by the system. • Weighted DPM: the sum of the numbers of minutes of downtime per year caused by any partial or total outage, weighted by the fraction of capacity lost during that outage.
• Total OFM: the number of total outages per year.
• Weighted OFM: the sum of the numbers of all partial or total outages per year, weighted by the severity of each outage. Severity usually refers to capacity loss. This paper focuses on how to obtain these measures when developing the system models.
In modeling telecom systems, the following terminology is used:
• CTMC: a state-based model with transition rates between states. In most cases, the Markov chains used in this paper are CTMC. Henceforth "Markov chain" is used to denote a CTMC.
• MRM: a Markov chain with reward rates attached to its states. Because this paper models the system-unavailability, this reward rate is usually between 0 and 1, representing the fraction of capacity loss. If all the reward rates are from the set 0, 1 , then MRM is an availability MRM (Fig. 1) . If some of the reward rates are in the real interval [0, 1], then MRM is a performability MRM ( Fig. 2) . The detailed reward assignment is discussed in Sections III-A and IV-A. An "arbitrary finite-state" MRM, MRM (Fig. 3) , is an MRM with no restriction on the number of states or transitions, sometimes called an " -state, -transition" MRM to differentiate it from more restricted forms.
An "equivalent" MRM, MRM (Fig. 4) , is a 2-state, 2-transition availability MRM whose steady-state behavior with respect to -expected reward rates is equivalent to the original arbitrary availability or performability MRM. One state is the up state with reward rate 0; the other state is the down state with reward rate 1. The transition rate from the up to the down state is ; the transition rate from the down to the up state is . There are infinitely many MRM with identical steady-state behavior but different failure and repair rates (Fig. 5 ). Any MRM with the same ratio exhibits identical steady-state behavior: their -expected steady-state reward rate is the same. This could be proved by solving the steady-state balance equations for the 2-state CTMC [16] , [17] . The steady-state probabilities are:
These probabilities are unchanged when is replaced by , and is replaced by , where is a positive real number.
A canonical MRM, MRM ( Fig. 6 ), is an MRM whose repair rate has been normalized to , and failure rate normalized to . The construction of the canonical form [9] means that there is a unique representative for the class of MRM with identical steady-state behavior with respect to -expected reward rates. 
B. Aggregation in Availability MRM
Aggregation in availability MRM works by partitioning the graph into 2 classes of states: up and down. Transitions from up states to down states are called red transitions; transitions from down states to up states are called green transitions (Fig. 7) .
To transform an arbitrary availability MRM into its MRM , compute a and . The basic idea is that equals the "sum over all the red transitions of the transition's failure rate" times the "conditional probability of being in the transition's source state," given that the source state is in the set of up states. A similar technique is applied to the green transitions to generate .
C. Aggregation in Performability MRM
"Aggregation in performability MRM" is more complex. In performability MRM the graph is partitioned into classes of states, where all states within a class have the same reward rate or outage level. Red transitions are transitions from classes of lower to higher outage. Green transitions are transitions from classes of higher to lower outage (Fig. 8) .
The technique for computing and is similar to the computation for availability models. However, the failure rate is multiplied by the absolute value of the "difference in reward rates between the originating and terminating states." Also, the probability of being in the set of up states or down states is replaced by the -expected reward rate. The basic idea is to weigh the transitions by the degree of the failure/repair (the difference in reward rates), and to weigh the probability of being in a state by the degree of the availability/outage (the state's reward rate).
In availability models, the absolute value of the difference in reward rates between the down states and up states is always 1. Therefore, the computation is the same as in performability MRM, but because multiplying by 1 is a trivial operation, it is omitted.
D. Use of the Technique
The intention is to transform a multi-state submodel to a 2-state CTMC, while preserving enough information to calculate measures of interest at a higher level in the hierarchical model, and to reduce state space. Some of the measures to calculate, e.g., DPM, are directly linked with steady-state behavior such as steady-state availability or -expected reward rate. In this case, both MRM and MRM can be used. However, if the information about the flow between states is needed, e.g., in calculating OFM, only MRM can be used. As shown is Section V-A, MRM preserves that information.
The transformation to a 2-state CTMC can be useful by itself, not necessarily with hierarchical composition. It can be used to show system characteristics concisely to customers and managers, and to find bottlenecks in the system by decomposing and into their component parts.
III. COMPUTING AND IN AVAILABILITY MRM
Because the equivalent MRM is used to replace the original MRM, the measures to compute must remain the same during this transformation. The algorithms for computing the equivalent rates are discussed; they must be applied to guarantee the equivalence.
This section shows how to compute and for availability models. 
A. Algorithm for Computing and
B. Proof: MRM is Equivalent to the Original MRM
This proof is based on showing that the steady-state probability of being in the up state in MRM is equal to being in the set of up states in the MRM ( ) and that the steady-state probabilities of being in the down states are also equal ( ). From (4) and (6): (8) The second step applies the fact that in steady-state, the rate of flow out of the set of up states equals the rate of flow into the set of up states . (The latter is also the rate of flow out of the set of down states.) This has been shown in [8] . To make it clear and consistent with the proof in Section IV, the proof is developed here. Consider the Kolmogorov differential equation in steady-state: (9) is the steady-state probability vector, is the infinitesimal generator matrix, of which the diagonal elements are , and element is (10)
Without loss of generality, number the set of up-states from 1 to , and the set of down-states from to
By changing the order of the summations, the first term on left is equal to the first term on the right; thus
Now, having proved that step #2 in (8) is valid, go back to the main thread of the proof. The steady-state probability of being in the up-state in the is:
From (8): (18) Combining (17) and (18) 
Computing is similar (24)
B. Proof That MRM is Equivalent to the Original MRM
The proof that MRM is equivalent to the original arbitrary MRM for performability model is similar to the proof in Section IV-A for availability MRM.
From (21)- (24), it is shown that if (25) can be proved:
The physical meaning of the left-side of (25) is the rate of flow due to the outage transitions, weighted by the severity of the outages. The physical meaning of the right-side is the rate of flow due to the repair transitions, weighted by the capacity gains from the repairs.
Without loss of generality, let
Multiply each equation in (10) by ,
Add these equations (27) together:
Change the order of the summations in the second terms on both sides of (31) to get:
This proves (25). The rest of the proof can follow the same procedure as in the proof for availability MRM and obtain:
The proof for showing is similar.
V. APPLICATIONS
A. Application to Modeling of Telecommunication Systems
As stated in the Introduction, models of telecommunication systems are usually very large. The overall technique is to break a large model into a hierarchy of submodels which have -independent failure modes. Each submodel is analyzed, and simplified to a 2-state CTMC, e.g., MRM . The and are computed from the submodel. After this operation, the system reliability/availability measures can be calculated, with a much smaller state space.
The next question is: Is this an exact technique or an approximation?
In general it is an approximation, because any time one reduces an -state, -transition MRM to a 2-state, 2-transition MRM some errors are introduced. For example, the holding time in the up/down state in the 2-state, 2-transition MRM is exponentially distributed, while in the original -state, -transition MRM, the holding time in the set of up/down states is usually not exponentially distributed.
However, for a large class of problems, among which are many large, complex telecommunications system, this technique is exact. The necessary conditions for this technique to be exact are:
• The measures being extracted are steady-state.
• The subsystems being transformed into MRM are -independent from other subsystems. If not, the technique can still be used, provided that the -dependence can be expressed at some higher level in the hierarchy. Four common measures used in telecom industry were introduced in Section II-A, and use of MRM and MRM were introduced in Section II-D. This section provides more details, to show that this is an exact technique in computing all 4 measures.
Using the equivalent form, MRM , the -expected reward rate can be preserved as shown in Sections III-B and IV-B. Thus, measures like DPM can be obtained. In addition, from (4): (36) [or similar derivation of (21)] the throughput (or weighted throughput in performability MRM case) is preserved. The -expected holding time (or weighted holding time in performability MRM case) in the set of up/down states can also be computed. Then measures like OFM can be extracted. The availability MRM is usually used for unweighted measures like Total DPM and Total OFM, while performability MRM is used for Weighted DPM and Weighted OFM because both are weighted measures.
If one is interested in DPM, the canonical form, MRM , can also provide the exact solution. From the definition of MRM in Section II-A, it is easy to see that and (37) The -expected reward rate is preserved in this simplified form. It is especially useful in computing Weighted DPM because many existing tools do not support computing and for performability MRM. However, the information about the flow between states and the -expected holding time is lost. This is the penalty for not computing the exact value of and . Thus, the canonical form MRM cannot be used in computing OFM.
In summary, the use of the 2 simplified forms in the modeling of telecommunication systems is shown in Table I. A typical telecommunication network element consists of one or more shelves with multiple modules in each shelf. Some of the modules are support modules; others are payload modules.
Typical support modules are power supplies, backplanes, buses, and system processors. Support modules often have redundancy to yield a higher level of availability in the shelf, e.g., of a power supply subsystem consisting of two or more power supply modules. Support subsystems are typically modeled as availability MRM, because loss of a power supply subsystem or backplane usually causes a total outage. Other modules are payload modules. Typical payload modules are front-end modules which talk to higher-level network elements and back-end modules which talk to lower-level network elements. Like support modules, payload modules might have redundancy, and are modeled as availability MRM if Total DPM or Total OFM are concerned. However, unlike support elements, payload modules are typically modeled as performability MRM when Weighted DPM and Weighted OFM are concerned, because loss of one or more payload modules is considered as a partial outage, rather than a total outage.
B. Example: Computing and
This example demonstrates how to compute and . Consider a subsystem consisting 3 payload modules of the same type, each carrying 1/3 of the network traffic, shared repair. and hour . Suppose one wants to obtain all 4 measures. An availability MRM could be used to model this payload subsystem for Total DPM and Total OFM and to calculate and . (These numbers can be used in a MRM at a higher level model.) Then use performability MRM to model the subsystem for Weighted DPM and Weighted OFM, and to calculate another set of and . Fig. 9 shows the availability MRM; there are 4 states, numbered 0 to 3, by the number of failed payload modules. Because only state 3 represents a total outage, the reward assignment is:
, . The only red transition is ; the only green transition is . From (4) and (6) , it is easy to obtain (38) (39)
To verify the accuracy, the Total DPM of this subsystem calculated from the and is 0.0054 minutes/year, and Total OFM is times/year. These are the same as the numbers calculated from the MRM without using the equivalent rates.
To have the and numbers for system weighted measures, a performability MRM (Fig. 10) is needed. It differs from Fig. 9 at the reward assignment:
, . It represents the fraction of the payload-capacity loss. Red transitions As a verification, Weighted DPM and Weighted OFM calculated from the above and for the subsystem are 632 minutes and 0.44 times/year respectively. They are the same as the result from the MRM without using the equivalent rates.
C. Example: VME System Configured as PBX
Consider the system in Fig. 11 : a 20-slot VME chassis configured as a PBX shelf consisting of
• a mated pair of processor boards to provide the shelf control function (SC), • a pool of 3 intelligent I/O controllers to provide the front-end control function (FEC) (talking to the public telephone system), • a pool of 15 intelligent I/O controllers providing the back-end control function (BEC) (controlling phones), • a dual-redundant power supply, • a system bus to interconnect the modules. Fig. 12 shows a simple hierarchical model of the telecom shelf. At the module level, the shelf-control function is modeled as a mated-pair of processor boards including hardware faults, software faults, fault coverage, switchover time, reboot time, and repair time. This model has 10 states (details are not shown in the figure) . If the software is modeled in more detail, it could grow much larger.
The front-end and back-end control functions are both modeled as intelligent I/O controllers and model hardware faults, software faults, reboot time, and repair time. Both models consist of 4 states for a single module.
Other system modules include the system bus and the power supply. The system bus is a simple 2-state Markov chain or corresponding Petri-net model. The power supply is a simple The number of states of the model is the product of the numbers of states of the 5 submodels. If this PBX were modeled using a flat model, it would require states. Now with hierarchical composition, the model is shown as a 2-level hierarchy (module-level and shelf-level) with the results of the module-level being used as input to the shelf-level: the of the mated-pair availability MRM becomes the failure rate for the 2-place, 2-transition shelf-control SRN in the shelf-level model, and the mated-pair becomes the repair rate for the shelf-control SRN in the shelf-level model. The connection between the levels of the hierarchy is shown by arrows leaving the lower-level model and labeled with the measure that is being used as input in the upper-level model.
The shelf-control, front-end, and back-end functions are modeled as -independent. However, there are some failures in these modules, such as faults in the bus interface logic, which couple to all the modules on the bus. These faults are accounted for in the system bus module-a bus failure brings down the whole shelf. Therefore, these modules can still be modeled as -independent. This is an example of migrating -dependencies from -dependent modules into a module at a higher level in the model hierarchy.
Using the method in this paper it would require states at the shelf level, and at most 10 states at the module level. This is a great saving of state space; and it does not compromise the accuracy of the DPM and OFM measures.
The same technique could be used to model a network-element consisting of multiple PBX shelves. In this case one would compute and for the shelf, and use them as input in the higher level (system-level) model, as shown in Fig. 12 . 
D. Example: Improving the Understanding of System Availability
Besides reducing state space, the transformation of a multistate submodel into a 2-state CTMC can be useful in improving understanding of system availability. This is actually applicable to a stand-alone model, not necessarily with hierarchical composition. With and computed from the model, the characteristics of the system can be shown succinctly. And the bottleneck of availability can be revealed by decomposing and into their summands. Consider a 2-component parallel redundant system with a single shared-repair facility. The availability model is shown in Fig. 13 . Then in the numerator of . This shows that , not , is the key in improving ; thus improving system availability.
